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Article 8

PROTECTIVE PARITY AND THE LAWS OF WAR
Derek finks *
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, protective schemes in the law of war are tightly coupled to rigid, status categories.' The contours of these status catego* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Associate
Professor of Law Designate, Arizona State University College of Law. Thanks to Adam
Cox, Jack Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, Harold Hongju Koh,Jordan Paust, Eric Posner,
Kal Raustiala, and John Yoo for helpful comments.
1 The "law of war" encompasses two distinct bodies of rules: the jus ad bellumrules governing when uses of force are lawful; and the jus in bello---rules governing
the conduct of war. "International humanitarian law" refers to the corpus of jus in
bello and perhaps some rules-such as the prohibitions on "genocide" and "crimes
against humanity"-formally outside the jus in bello. The jus in bello itself has two
principal subdivisions: "Geneva law" and "Hague law." Geneva law, embodied principally in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 additional Protocols,
prescribes an extensive body of detailed rules governing the treatment of the victims
of armed conflict. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GWS]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GWS Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. Hague law,
embodied principally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, governs the means
and methods of warfare, tactics, and the general conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This is not to say that Geneva
law includes no rules governing means and methods of warfare, or that Hague law
includes no rules governing the treatment of war victims-indeed, each treaty series
includes elements of the other. This terminology, although conceptually imprecise,
emphasizes the distinction between the two kinds of regimes-one governing the
treatment of persons subject to the enemy's authority (Geneva law), the other governing the treatment of persons subject to the enemy's lethality (Hague law). In con-
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ries (and the content of corresponding protective schemes) reflect
the dual normative commitments of this body of law: military necessity
and humanitarianism. Formal protection varies along a number of
axes (including combatant status, nationality, territory, and the character of the conflict) because it is thought that these factors roughly
track the vulnerability of and the security challenges posed by specific
status groups. In early law of war treaties, specific status categories are
defined in terms that encourage protection-seeking states (and at
times individuals) to orient their behavior in ways that promote the
objectives of humanitarian law. Protection, in these treaties, is a carrot for rule-regarding behavior; harsh, summary treatment at the
hands of the enemy, is the stick. Such an approach, by design, includes coverage gaps.
Beginning with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this understanding of status has been in decline. Over the last half century, protective
schemes have converged and coverage gaps have closed. From the
"human rights" perspective, these developments are all for the good.
The "humanization of humanitarian law" reflects the progressive trajectory of international law in which universal human rights trump
parochial state interests. 2 From the "traditionalist" perspective, the
law of war has lost its compass. Protection of unlawful combatants (1)
undermines the humanitarian ambitions of the law of war by compromising the protection of innocent civilians; and (2) undermines political and institutional support for the law of war by imposing on states
obligations that are inconsistent with various security imperatives.
Both views are flawed. Protection should, contra the "human rights"
view, accommodate the realities of the battlefield. On the other hand,
humane treatment of the enemy, irrespective of pre-capture conduct,
furthers the military objectives of the capturing state.
My argument is that humanitarian protection in time of war
should not vary by detainee status category-what I will call "protective parity." The Article has a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension. Through an analysis of the legal situation of unlawful
combatants, I illustrate that (1) protective schemes are converging;
and (2) although the protective significance of POW status is declining, there are some persistent gaps in coverage.

temporary parlance, "international humanitarian law" embraces the whole jus in bello,
in both its Geneva and Hague dimensions. See generally INGRID DETrER, THE LAW OF
WAR 158-67 (2d ed. 2000) (surveying these terminological issues).
2 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 239 (2000).
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The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims
thatjustify this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are
systematically overprotected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are systematically underprotected. To make this
case, I offer a cluster of offensive claims and one defensive claim. On
the offensive side, I argue that various claims for expanding or contracting humanitarian protection do not track status categories. In
this way, the claims that undergird these ostensibly competing schools
of thought support "protective parity." Consider the following related
points. If protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests
(think of the policy arguments advanced by the United States to justify
its treatment of the detainees in Cuba), then some status categories
(e.g., POWs) are systematically overprotected. That is, these security
based claims, if valid, would apply irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. If humane treatment of
the enemy increases battlefield effectiveness (because poor treatment
discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop morale,
and decreases political support for the war effort), then some status
categories (e.g., unlawful combatants) are systematically
underprotected.
On the defensive side, I argue that "protective parity" is consistent with the principle of distinction. Even if "irregularization" undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that
protective status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize individual combatants because these categories necessarily trade on collective considerations-such as the organizational characteristics of
the fighting force. The rule of distinction would be better served by
an individualized "war crimes" approach that accorded all fighters
substantial humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic requirements of due process) individual bad actors.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STATUS CATEGORIES
IN THE LAW OF WAR

Individual status categories have played an important role in the
law of war. The scope and content of protective schemes have traditionally turned on whether affected persons are properly classified as
"combatants," "noncombatants," "prisoners of war," or "civilians."
Why this is so requires some explanation. The jus in bello governs the
conduct of war (rather than the legality or legitimacy of the war itself)
and is, in this sense, a second-best humanitarianism. Its rules promote
humanitarian values within a context most inhospitable to such val-
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ues: large-scale, organized hostilities. Given this limitation, the law of
war seeks to define and eliminate "unnecessary" suffering (and devastation) in time of war. Three types of rules promote this objective: (1)
rules governing who and what may be attacked; (2) rules governing
the means and methods used in executing lawful attacks; and (3)
rules governing the treatment of persons subject to the authority of
the enemy (e.g., persons captured and detained in time of war). Status categories play a central (though somewhat different) role in all
three regimes.
Type-1 rules build on a distinction between military targets and
civilian targets-only the former may be made the object of an attack.
Therefore, persons properly classified as "civilians" enjoy "noncombatant immunity" from attack. This is not to say that any attack resulting
in the death of civilians is unlawful-the law prohibits directing at3
tacks against civilians as such.
Type-2 rules, in part, build on the distinction between military
and civilian targets-prohibiting means and methods that cause death
and destruction disproportionate to the concrete military advantage
issuing from the attack. Once again, the objectives of the law of war
(and the interests it seeks to protect) require categorization of targets
(including persons) -targets are assigned a status that determines the
4
scope and content of protection accorded that potential target.
Type-3 rules are similar in some respects but also importantly different. These rules, embodied principally in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their protocols, protect persons no longer participating
in the hostilities who have been made subject to the authority of the
enemy. For example, the prisoner of war convention protects persons
captured and detained by the enemy.5 Given the scope of their application, these rules (as a conceptual matter) do not rely upon the distinction between "military" and "civilian." Nevertheless, these rules do
apportion humanitarian protection along rigid status categories.
Each treaty defines, with some precision, the categories of persons
3

See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 49-50, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25-26; see also
NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL Hu-

JUDITH GAIL GARDAM,

MANITARIAN LAW

(1993).

4 See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 51-52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27; see also
A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATILEFIELD 14-19 (1996).
5 See generally GPW, supra note 1 (protecting specific categories of persons captured and detained by enemy forces); GC, supra note 1, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. at 288 (protecting persons "who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals"); see also
JEAN PICTET,

29-49 (1985).

DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW
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protected by it. Why this is so is less clear. Protection is apportioned
across status categories even though the distinctions between these
categories do not directly serve the objectives of Geneva law. These
status categories-most importantly, "prisoner of war" and "civilian"are defined so as to incentivize various actors (collective and individual) to promote the overall policy objectives of the law of war. That is,
protection is offered as a carrot to encourage rule-regarding and rulepromoting conduct at the organizational and individual level. The
protection accorded by Type-3 rules (Geneva law) is extended as a
carrot to induce behavior that promotes the objectives of Type-i and
Type-2 rules (Hague law).
This point requires some clarification. Consider Type-i rules in
more detail. The law of war requires that attacks be directed only
against valid military targets. 6 Therefore, no attack may be directed
against civilians or civilian objects-even if doing so would serve the
military interests of the attacking force. The law of war, in this sense,
is predicated on the distinction between military and civilian objects.
One important incidence of this general distinction is the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants. Under the law of war, only
combatants may be made the object of an attack, so as to spare the
latter, as much as possible, the ravages of war. Noncombatants are
granted immunity from attack so long as they do not participate directly in the hostilities. In this sense, the protection of noncombatants from attack is predicated on a clear distinction between
combatants and noncombatants. If attacking forces cannot distinguish between enemy soldiers and civilians, this type of rule cannot
work well. If so-called irregular fighters-those not part of the regular
armed forces-are "lawful" combatants, then the distinction between
soldier and civilian is blurred. It is the goal of protecting innocent
civilians that requires a sharp line between combatants and noncombatants. The upshot is that "regularization" of armed forces is essential to the proper functioning of Hague law.
Of course, it does not necessarily follow from this point that irregular fighters should be denied humanitarian protection upon capture.
Indeed, there are at least two ways to understand the relationship between Hague law (Types-i and -2 rules) and Geneva law (Type-3
rules). On the one hand, the regimes could be completely
decoupled. That is, Geneva law need not have any structural relationship to Hague law. On this view, all persons captured in time of war
are entitled to humanitarian protection irrespective of whether their
6 See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 25, 36 Stat. at 2302, 1 Bevans at
648.
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wartime conduct transgressed the rule of distinction. I will call this
view, the "human rights" view. Or, as previously described, Geneva
law could be oriented in such a way as to induce regularization of
armed forces. To do so, Geneva law would delimit the categories of
individuals qualifying for protection. On this view, post-capture protections would extend to two groups: those who do not fight (noncombatants), and those who fight in forces that are sufficiently
regularized (lawful combatants).
"Irregulars"-the residual category of so-called unlawful combatants-would enjoy no protection. The idea is to deter "irregularization" by threatening the denial of any rights-bearing status. In the
Hague Conventions of 1907, the "rights and obligations" of war extended only to those combatants satisfying the four criteria of regularization: operate under a responsible command structure; wear a fixed,
distinctive emblem visible at a distance; carry arms openly; and conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war. 7 The 1929 and
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Prisoners of War,
drawing on this tradition, defined the category of persons protected
by it in roughly the same terms. 8 This "traditionalist" perspective suggests that denial of POW status leaves captured combatants largely unprotected by humanitarian law. 9 In one influential writer's view, such
7

See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2295-96, 1 Bevans at

643-44.

8 See, e.g., GPW, supra note 1, art. 4(A)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
9 See DETTER, supra note 1, at 148 ("Unlawful combatants.., though they are a
legitimate target for any belligerent action, are not, if captured, entitled to any prisoner of war status.... They are often summarily tried and enjoy no protection under
international law."); U.S.

DEP'T OF WAR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

Gen.
Order No. 100, art. LVII (1863); EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 481
(Dublin, Luke White 1792) ("A nation attacked by such sort of enemies [unlawful
combatants] is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules of wars in
form."); Richard R. Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

the Hague), in INTERNATIONAL

DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

93, 105-06 (Henry

Dunant Inst. ed., 1988) (arguing that unlawful combatants "upon capture were not
entitled to be treated either as prisoners of war or as peaceful civilians" and that they
"fell outside the protected categories .... "); Michael W. Brough, The POW in a Time of
Terrorism: An Investigation into Moral Status, in JOINT SERVICES CONFERENCE ON PROFES-

JSCOPE 2003: ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND HOMELAND DEavailable at http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE03/Brough03.

SIONAL ETHICS, PROC.

FENSE

(2003),

html:
Captured combatants who are not POWs are devoid of GC protection, and
they are at the mercy of the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power may
agree to treat the captives as if they were POWs (as President Bush declared
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persons were placed upon capture at the mercy of the detaining
0
power.'
he would do for Afghan detainees), but they are not bound by international
agreement to do so ....
Id.; see also COLM McKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITv OF KILLING IN WAR
137 (2002):
The formal approach to combatancy of the Hague Regulations yielded a
clear delineation of the categories of combatant and civilian. However, this
clear delineation also meant that there was a gap between the two lawful
categories of combatant and civilian. There was a third category of person
in war: the unlawful combatant. Those who did not abide by the rules set out
in the [Hague Regulations defining lawful combatants] were unlawful combatants and were accorded no protection.
Id. (emphasis added); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 256 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (arguing that unlawful combatants
"were considered to be war criminals, and could be shot when captured"); 2 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER,

INTERNATIONAL

LAw

AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND

115-17 (1968) (arguing that unprivileged
belligerents are in the same position as "spies," and as such, entitled only to the "minimum requirements imposed by the standard of civilization"-which he suggests includes the right to "a [standardless] trial"); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37
(1911) (" [W]ar law has a short shrift for the noncombatant who violates its principles
by taking up arms."); id. at 35-72 (outlining the long history of summary treatment
accorded unlawful combatants); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 549 (1954). Stone maintains that the distinction between unprivileged and
privileged combatants
draws the line between those personnel who, on capture, are entitled under
international law to certain minimal treatment as prisoners of war, and those
not entitled to such protection. 'Noncombatants' who engaged in hostilities
are one of the classes deprived of such protection .... Such unprivileged
belligerents, though not condemned by international law, are not protected by
it, but are left to the discretion of the belligerent threatened by their
activities.
Id.; see also G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatantsand the Question of Guerilla Warfare,
in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 206, 208 (Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire
McCoubrey eds., 1998):
Civilians participating in combat ceased to be immune from attack. They
might be killed in combat, and, on capture, were liable to be treated as marauders and executed summarily at the discretion of the captor commander.
.. [T] heir very participation, however conducted, was in itself a violation of
the law of war, or, alternatively, conduct that put them outside its protection
and left them at the mercy of the enemy.
10 Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency". Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 328 (1952). Baxter concluded:
The correct legal formulation is, it is submitted, that armed and unarmed
hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than those entitled to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians merely deprive
such individuals of a protection they might otherwise enjoy under internaTRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
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This is not to say that the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and certainly not the 1977 Protocols thereto) take this approach. Indeed, in
my view, they do so only to a limited extent. As I demonstrate more
fully in Part II, the 1949 Geneva Conventions-though they draw on
many structural features of traditional law of war treaties-lay the
foundations for the "human rights" perspective that so clearly predominates in the 1977 Protocols (and other important developments
in humanitarian law). The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons (GC) 11 accords substantial protection, which
tracks closely the protection accorded under the POW Convention
(GPW),12 to all enemy nationals who have "fallen into the hands of
the enemy." Moreover, the GC expressly applies to "unlawful combatants"-authorizing states in such cases to derogate, where necessary
for security reasons, from certain rights recognized in the treaty.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Protocol
I, and the procedural rights regime embedded in the Conventions'
grave breach regime provide important humanitarian protections to
persons subject to the authority of the enemy-without regard to the
"status" or pre-capture behavior of the individual in question.
These developments, without question, have blunted the sharp
edge of status determinations. Nevertheless, they have not eliminated
the protective consequences of status in the law of war. Only prisoners of war are entitled to combatant immunity-the rule that lawful
combatants may not be subject to criminal prosecution for their very
participation in the hostilities; and only POWs enjoy so-called "assimilation rights"-the rule requiring that lawful combatants be accorded
the same rights as members of the detaining state's armed forces. In
addition, the application of the GC to unlawful combatants is conditioned by Article 5, which authorizes states to restrict detainee rights
where necessary to protect state security. Finally, the gap-filling provisions-common Article 3 and Article 75 of Protocol I-do not provide a comprehensive protective scheme. In short, coverage gaps have
narrowed, but nevertheless persist.
The question is how best to evaluate these developments. From
the traditionalist perspective, they are counterproductive in that they
tional law and place them virtually at the power of the enemy ....
International law deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents because
of the danger their acts present to their opponent ....
[Privileged belligerents] have a protected status upon capture, whilst other belligerents not so
identified do not benefit from any comprehensive scheme of protection.
Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
11 GC, supra note 1.
12 GPW, supra note 1.
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erode the distinction between combatant and noncombatant by undermining the incentive structure of the law of war. From the human
rights perspective, however, these developments represent a sensible
compromise between humanitarian values and military necessity. As
suggested in the Introduction, both views are unpersuasive. Note initially that both views calibrate treatment by combatant status category.
Clearly this is so for the traditionalist view but it is also true for the
human rights perspective. Contemporary Geneva law, even in its most
progressive moments, does not contemplate "protective parity" across
status categories.1 3 The primary reason for this is simple: graduated
protective schemes, it is thought, promote humanitarian values by
reinforcing the principle of distinction.
In this Article, I reexamine the assumptions embedded in this bit
of conventional wisdom. In doing so, I ask what work we might reasonably expect combatant status categories to do, and how best to design the protective regimes in view of these potential functions. My
claim is that the traditional notion of POW status should carry no protective implications. In other words, I suggest that unlawful combatants should be protected to the same extent as POWs (lawful
combatants). Developments in humanitarian law, military (and law
enforcement) policy, and the nature of organized hostilities favor
"protective parity" across all categories of war detainees.
II.

THE DECLINE OF STATUS: TowARD PROTECTIVE PARITY

In this Part, I outline the aforementioned developments in Ge-

neva law. My aim is to provide a brief overview of the concrete protective consequences that attach to combatant status determinations.
Toward this end, I survey the rights of POWs and the rights of unlawful combatants-individuals who participate in the hostilities without
satisfying the minimum legal requirements to do so. This survey supports two important propositions that will serve as the backdrop for
my broader policy claim. First, Geneva law accords substantial legal
protection to both lawful combatants (POWs) and unlawful combat-

ants. Second, there are nevertheless important discrepancies in the
protective schemes applicable to these status categories.

13 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Geneva law has moved in the
direction of "protective parity." I document in great detail the various developments
in other work. See, e.g., DerekJinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARv.
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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ProtectionsApplicable to POWs

Prisoners of war enjoy substantial international legal protection
pursuant to the GPW. 14 These protections include: (1) the right to
humane treatment (including important limitations on coercive interrogation tactics);'

5

(2) due process rights; 16 (3) the right to release

and repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities; 17 and (4) the
right to communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of)
protective agencies.' 8 The GPW also prohibits reprisals against
POWs,1 9 and it precludes the use of POWs as slave labor.20 In addition, POWs may not be prosecuted for their participation in the hostilities-that is, they are entitled to "combatant immunity." 21 Moreover,
the GPW makes clear that POW rights are inalienable 2 2 and nonderogable. 23 Finally, the GPW requires that states suppress the mistreatment of POWs by investigating, prosecuting, and punishing
14 GPW, supra note 1.
15 Id. art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146-48 (regarding humane treatment); see also id. art. 17, 6 U.S.T. at 3330-32, 75 U.N.T.S. at 148-50 (establishing
rules concerning interrogation); id. arts. 21-48, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-54, 75 U.N.T.S. at
152-72 (governing conditions of confinement).
16 Id. arts. 99-108, 6 U.S.T. at 3392-400, 75 U.N.T.S. at 210-18.
17 Id. art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224.
18 Id. arts. 8-11, 6 U.S.T. at 3324-28, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142-46.
19 Id. art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
20 Id. arts. 49-57, 6 U.S.T. at 3354-60, 75 U.N.T.S. at 172-78.
21 This privilege is, as a formal matter, extra-conventional in that the Geneva
Conventions do not expressly accord any such privilege. It is nevertheless universally

recognized. See, e.g., United States v. List, 11

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE

No. 10, at 757, 788
(1948); Geoffrey S. Corn & Michael L. Smidt, "To Be Or Not To Be, That Is The Question": Contemporary Military Operations and The Status of Captured Personnel, 1999 ARw
LAW., June 1999, at 1, 14 (arguing that combatants, as privileged belligerents, are
entitled to "a blanket of immunity for their pre-capture warlike acts"); Georg
Schwarzenberger, Human Rights and Guerrilla Warfare, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 246, 246
(1971); Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 205, 212
(1977) ("[T]hose who are entitled to the juridical status of 'privileged combatant' are
immune from criminal prosecution for those warlike acts which do not violate the
laws and customs of war but which might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law."). Moreover, the privilege may be inferred from several provisions of the
GPW. See GPW, supra note 1, arts. 82, 87-89, 6 U.S.T. at 3382-86, 75 U.N.T.S. at
200-04.
22 GPW, supra note 1, art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
23 Id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42 (providing that the Convention "shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into
the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation").
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
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individuals responsible for violations of the Convention. 2 4 Aggravated
mistreatment of persons entitled to POW status constitutes a "grave
breach" of international humanitarian law25 -giving rise to individual
criminal liability. 26 The criminalization of POW rules is now also rec-

ognized in many national penal codes 27 and several important international agreements concerning the scope of international criminal
law-including the statutes of the International Criminal Court2 8 and
the ad hoc U.N. criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 29
B. Protections Applicable to Unlawful Combatants
I next outline the protective schemes governing the treatment of
unlawful combatants in Geneva law-that is, individuals who participate in hostilities without satisfying the requirements for POW status.
Traditionally, international law did not protect unlawful combatants
but, as I describe below, all captured combatants enjoy substantial protection (even if some important discrepancies persist). Whether this
convergence in protective schemes is normatively attractive is addressed in Part III.
The GC provides detailed rules governing the treatment of "civilians" in armed conflicts, and the substance of these rules mirrors in
most important respects the rights of POWs. These protections include: due process rights (including the right to fair trial in the event
of criminal prosecution) ;30 the right to humane treatment;3 1 freedom
from coercive interrogation;3 2 freedom from discrimination;3 3 the
24
25
26

Id. arts. 129-31, 6 U.S.T. at 3418-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236-38.
See id. arts. 129-31, 6 U.S.T. at 3418-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236-38.
Id. art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; see als0JORDANJ. PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 21-26 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the emergence of individual criminal responsibility in the laws of war).
27 See, e.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, InternationalHumanitarianLaw: National
Implementation Database, at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last visited May 19, 2004)
(providing excerpts of implementing national legislation from over fifty countries);
Coalition for the Int'l Criminal Court, National LegislationDatabase, at http://www.icc
now.org (last visited May 19, 2004) (providing full text of national war crimes legislation from over thirty-five states).
28 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999.
29 See Statute of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
30 See GC, supra note 1, arts. 64-76, 126, 146-47, 6 U.S.T. at 3558-618, 75
U.N.T.S. at 328-88.
31 Id. arts. 27-34, 6 U.S.T. at 3536-40, 75 U.N.T.S. at 306-10.
32 Id. arts. 31-32, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308.
33 Id. arts. 1, 3, 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-36, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-306.
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right to repatriation (including the right to leave enemy territory voluntarily) ;34 the right to internal camp governance; 3 5 and the prohibition on attacks directed against civilian objects (including strict
prohibition of attacks on hospitals and other facilities providing essential services to the civilian population) .36
The GC applies to all enemy nationals-including "unlawful"
combatants-not protected by the other Conventions. 37 Although this
point is often overlooked in current debates, 38 it enjoys broad support
in the legal literature, 39 contemporary international war crimes jurisprudence,40 and national military manuals. 4 1 Moreover, the text of
the GC suggests that it applies to unlawful combatants. Persons protected by the Convention are "those who, at any given moment and in
any manner whatsoever, find themselves ...in the hands of a Party...
34 Id. arts. 35-38, 77, 132-35, 6 U.S.T. at 3540-608, 75 U.N.T.S. at 310-78.
35 Id. arts. 101-04, 6 U.S.T. at 3586-88, 75 U.N.T.S. at 356-58.
36 Id. arts. 13-26, 6 U.S.T. at 3526-36, 75 U.N.T.S. at 296-306.
37 As I develop more fully below, common Article 3, the provisions of Part II, and
the penal repression regime are applicable irrespective of the nationality of the person in question. See id. arts. 3, 13-26, 145-47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-618, 75 U.N.T.S. at
296-388.
38 See, e.g., Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Noncombatants, in The HANDBOOK OF HuMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 65, 67-68 (Deiter Fleck ed., 1995); Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5, rev. 1
corr. (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm.
39 See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE

OF

Two 1977

PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1949, at 261-63 (1982); HILAIRE

MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:

137 (2d ed. 1998); George
Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 Am.J.
INT'L L. 891 (2002); Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/UnprivilegedCombatants,"85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 849 (2003); Draper, supra note 9; F. Kalshoven, The
Position of GuerrillaFightersunder the Law of War, 11 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET
DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 55, 70-71 (1972); Esbjorn Rosenblad, Guerrilla Warfare and
InternationalLaw, 12 REVUE DE DROIT PtNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 91,
98 (1973).
40 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalit, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1 271 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 1998) ("If an individual is
not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the
First or Second Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are satisfied.").
41 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,FM 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 31
(1956):
If a person is determined by a competent tribunal, acting in conformity with
Article 5 [GPW] not to fall within any of the categories listed in Article 4
[GPW], he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is, however,
a 'protected person' within the meaning of Article 4 [GC].
Id.; U.K. WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND pt. 3, at 96 (1958).
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE
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of which they are not nationals." 42 The provision defining "protected
persons" also makes clear that several categories of persons are not
protected by the GC. For example, nationals of a state "not bound by
the Convention are not protected by it."4 3 In addition, nationals of
"neutral" or "co-belligerent" states are not protected by the Convention "while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are." 44 And, as
previously discussed, the GC does not apply to persons protected by
any of the other Conventions. 45 The provision does not, however, expressly limit the application of the Convention to persons taking no
part in the hostilities. 46 Indeed, the Convention prescribes, in some
detail, rules governing the treatment of civilians "suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State. '4 7 It is also important to note that the definitions of "protected persons" in the
48
other Geneva Conventions are, without exception, quite detailed.
When read in light of the other Conventions, the GC should not be
interpreted as implicitly excluding from its protection a broad category
of individuals otherwise satisfying its definition of "protected persons."
Application of the GC to unlawful combatants, however, is qualified by Article 5-the so-called "derogation" provision. The provision
authorizes states, subject to important limitations, to deny protections
to individuals "suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State [or the Occupying Power]."'49 In full, it provides
that:
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected
of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such
individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the
favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of
such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is
detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such
42 GC, supra note 1, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
43
44
45
46

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47 Id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
48 See GWS, supra note 1, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 34; GWS Sea,
supra note 1, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 88; GPW, supra note 1, art. 4, 6
U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
49 GC, supra note 1, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
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person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication
under the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with
humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of
fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They
shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected
person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may
50
be.
To summarize, the GC protects unlawful combatants, and these
protections (when applicable in full) closely resemble the rights accorded under the GPW. Of course, these protections are subject to
derogation if necessary for state security. Three important discrepancies between POW and civilian protections must be registered.
First, the rights of civilians taking part in hostilities-unlawful
combatants-are subject to derogation in some circumstances; POW
rights are not. Second, POWs are assimilated, for protective purposes,
into the armed forces of the detaining state. As such, they are entitled
to trial before the same courts, and according to the same procedure
as members of the regular armed forces of the detaining state. Civilians enjoy no such protection. Third, POWs are entitled to combatant
immunity-that is, they may not be punished for their very participation in the hostilities. Civilians who take up arms may be subject to
criminal prosecution simply for having done so.
C.

Supplementary Protections

Several other aspects of Geneva law confer some protection on
unlawful combatants. These protective schemes are far less detailed
than the GC; nevertheless, because these regimes are broadly applicable, they illustrate the degree of convergence across status categories.
1.

Penal Repression Regime of the Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions also protect all unlawful combatants
facing trial for war crimes. Indeed, the Conventions prescribe a detailed inventory of procedural rights guarantees for prosecutions
brought under its substantive provisions. That is, the Conventions
provide for minimum procedural rights for any person charged with
serious violations of their substantive rules irrespective of the person's status under the Conventions.5 I Any persons prosecuted for violations of
50
51

Id.
See, e.g., id. art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
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the Geneva Conventions, irrespective of their status as "protected persons," must be provided with "safeguards of proper trial and defence,
which shall not be less favourable than" those outlined in Articles 105
and following of the GPW. 52 Article 105 specifically provides for basic
fair trial rights including: the right to counsel of the defendant's
choice, the right to confer privately with counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to an interpreter. 53 These provisions also require, for example, that accused persons be granted the same right of
appeal as that open to members of the armed forces of the detaining
54
Power.
2.

Common Article 3

The Geneva Conventions also specify fundamental humanitarian
protections applicable to all persons subject to the authority of a party
to the conflict. That is, the Conventions detail minimum protections
to be accorded all persons no longer taking part in hostilities irrespective of: (1) the territory in which the affected person is located; (2)
the nationality of the affected person; or (3) the character of the
armed conflict. These principles, first codified in common Article 3
of the Conventions, govern the treatment of persons no longer taking
active part in the hostilities. 55 All such persons are entitled to humane
treatment and, in the case of criminal charges, fair trial by "a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 56 It is also important to
note that this provision is, by its nature, applicable to "unlawful combatants" in that it governs the relations between states and informal
armed opposition groups. The provision obligates states to apply, at a
52 GWS, supra note 1, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; GWS Sea, supra
note 1, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; GPW, supra note 1, art. 129, 6
U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; GC, supra note 1, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75
U.N.T.S. at 386.
53 GPW, supra note 1, art. 105, 6 U.S.T. at 3396, 75 U.N.T.S. at 215.
54 Id. art. 106, 6 U.S.T. at 3398, 75 U.N.T.S. at 216.
55 It is important to note that the provision expressly covers persons who take up
arms against the state and applies even to persons who do not lay down their arms
voluntarily. See GWS, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34;
GWS Sea, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra
note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
56 GWS, supranote 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; GWS Sea,
supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra note 1, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
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minimum, the following principles in armed conflicts "not of an international character":
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed "hors de combat" by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
57
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Of course, common Article 3, by its terms, applies only to armed
conflicts "not of an international character."5 8 The structure and history of the Conventions, however, make clear that the provision applies in all armed conflicts. Utilizing language originally proposed as
text for the preamble to the four Conventions, the drafters of the provision sought to invoke the core principles of the treaty-those principles that should apply even in the absence of an international armed
conflict; those principles that would pierce the veil of sovereignty. Indeed, the character of common Article 3 was well understood by the
drafters of the Conventions, as evidenced by the ICRC Commentary:
"This minimum requirement in the case of a non-international armed
conflict, is a fortioiri applicable in international conflicts. It proclaims
the guiding principle common to all four Geneva Conventions, and

57 GWS, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; GWS Sea,
supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra note 1, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
58 GWS, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; GWS Sea,
supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra note 1, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
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from it each of them derives the essential provision around which it is
built."59

The purpose of common Article 3 was, therefore, to "ensur(e)
respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all civilised nations consider as valid everywhere and under all circumstances and as
being above and outside war itself."' 60 In short, "[i] t is both legally and
morally untenable that the rules contained in common Article 3,
which constitute mandatory minimum rules applicable to internal
conflicts, in which rules are less developed than in respect of international conflicts, would not be applicable to conflicts of an international character." 6' Indeed, the applicability of common Article 3 to
international armed conflicts is now recognized in the jurisprudence
of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ),62 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 63 the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ,64 and the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights. 65 It is U.S. military policy to apply
common Article 3 in all armed conflicts (and even in situations not
rising to the level of an "armed conflict" such as internal disturbances) .66 The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army endorses
this view as well. 6 7 Moreover, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,

now ratified by over 160 countries, clarifies that the protections codi59

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY-

IV

GENEVA CONVENTION RELA-

TIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CWILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR

14 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,

1958) [hereinafter GC COMMENTARY].
60 Id. at 44.
61 Prosecutor v. Delalie, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 1 150 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber Feb. 20, 2001).
62 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14
(June 27).
63 See Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 87 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
64 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for Rwanda Trial Chamber Sept. 2, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998).
65 See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11,137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 1] 155-56, OEA/ser.
L/V.97, doc. 38 (1997).
66 See Dep't of Defense, Directive 5100.77: DoD Law of War Program (Dec. 9,
1998). The directive states, in part: "The Heads of the DOD Components shall: Ensure
that the members of their Components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit
of the law of war during all other operations." Id. 5.31, at 4; see also Timothy P.
Bulman, A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised as Enlightened Policy: United States Law of
War ObligationsDuringMilitary Operations Other Than War, 159 MIL. L. REv. 152 (1999).
67 SeeJUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, JA-422: OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 8-9 (2003) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
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fled in common Article 3 apply, as a matter of positive international
law, to all armed conflicts. 68 This avalanche of legal authority
prompted the ICTY Appeals Chamber to proclaim that: "It is [now]
indisputable that common Article 3, which sets forth a minimum core
of mandatory rules, reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles
which underlie international humanitarian law as a whole, and upon
6
which the Geneva Conventions in their entirety are based. 9
3.

Article 75 of Additional Protocol I

Building on the protective schemes identified above, Article 75 of
Protocol I and Article 6 of Protocol II clearly establish minimum humanitarian protections applicable to all persons "in the power of" a
belligerent state-irrespective of whether any such person participated in the hostilities. Widely understood as the "gap filler" in Geneva law, 70 the "fundamental guarantees" provisions of the 1977
Protocols make clear that all persons subject to the authority of a belligerent are entitled to humanitarian protection. As discussed previously, the drafting history of Article 75 suggests that the provision was
designed: (1) to clarify the scope and application of several fundamental guarantees recognized in the 1949 Conventions; (2) to extend
greater protections to persons not covered by those Conventionsmost notably, nationals of the detaining power, nationals of co-belligerents and neutrals, and stateless persons and refugees; and, by implication, (3) to condition the derogation powers conferred on states
by Article 5 of the GC by rendering a broader range of rights expressly
nonderogable.

71

Two points regarding the scope and content of Article 75 are relevant for present purposes. First, the text, structure, and drafting history of Protocol I make plain that it covers unlawful combatants.
Second, Article 75 provides substantial protection-particularly to
persons detained, arrested, or interned and persons facing criminal
charges. As mentioned previously and discussed more fully below, the
substance of this provision is clearly modeled on and, as a consequence, closely resembles that of common Article 3. The most important advances relate to criminal procedure rights. In this regard, the
provision reads:
68
69

Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37.
Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,

for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber Feb. 20, 2001).
70 See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 9.
71 BOTHE ET AL., supra note 39, at 460-61.

143 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
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No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a
person found guilty of a penal offense related to the armed conflict
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and
regularly constituted court respecting the generally principles of
regular judicial procedures .... 72
Unlike common Article 3, Article 75 of Protocol I specifies many
of these principles. They include: (1) provision of "all necessary rights
and means of defence" (which almost certainly includes the right to
counsel, the right to be present at the hearing, the right to compel
process, the right to be informed of pending charges, the right to be
accorded sufficient time and resources to formulate a defense, and
the right to challenge alleged unfairness in the proceedings on appeal); 73 (2) the right to be presumed innocent;7 4 (3) freedom from
compelled self-incrimination; 75 (4) the right to be advised of rights
and available post-conviction remedies; 76 (5) freedom from ex post
facto application of the criminal law; 77 and (6) recognition of the
78
principle of non bis in idem.
D.

Persistent Gaps and Deficiencies in Geneva Law

Geneva law provides substantial legal protection to all war detainees including unlawful combatants. All persons detained by the enemy are entitled to the minimum protections of common Article 3
and Article 75 of Protocol I. And, in virtue of Articles 4 and 5 of the
GC, all enemy aliens are "protected persons" under the Conventions,
and are entitled, at a minimum, to humane treatment and fair trial
rights. This provision also makes clear that "unlawful combatants" are
presumptively covered by the full protections of the GC-even if some
of these protections can be suspended if (and so long as) necessary to
protect state security. Moreover, all persons accused of "war crimes"
are entitled to due process rights that mirror, in most important respects, the rights accorded POWs.
Does the denial of POW status carry any significant humanitarian
consequences? Although the analysis to this point strongly suggests
there are no such consequences, each alternative protective scheme is
arguably deficient in important respects. Of course, the GC writ large
72
73

Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 75(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 8.
Id. art. 75(4)(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37.

74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

75(4)(d),
75(4)(f),
75(4)(j),
75(4)(c),
75(4)(h),

1125
1125
1125
1125
1125

U.N.T.S. at 38.
U.N.T.S. at 38.
U.N.T.S. at 38.
U.N.T.S. at 37.
U.N.T.S. at 38.
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accords protection that in most important respects mirrors that of the
GPW. And although the GC protects unlawful combatants, its field of
application is limited to enemy nationals (who must also be nationals
of a state party to the Convention). In addition, the derogation regime of Article 5 empowers states to deny some unlawful combatants
certain rights recognized in the Convention if necessary to protect national security.
The other alternative protective schemes also exhibit potentially
significant deficiencies. Common Article 3 protects all combatants no
longer taking active part in hostilities, but the substantive rules of the
provision are cast in abstract terms-the precise contours of which are
unclear. In addition, the provision does not expressly include a right
to release and repatriation at the close of hostilities. Moreover, no
express provision is made in the Conventions for the enforcement of
common Article 3.79 Recall that the persons protected by common
Article 3 are not, as a formal matter, "protected persons" within the
meaning of the Conventions.8 0 As a consequence, violations of common Article 3 do not constitute "grave breaches" of the Conventions,
and, at the time the Conventions were drafted, it was unclear whether
violations of common Article 3 gave rise to individual criminal liability
at all.81 Article 75 of Protocol I gives rise to similar concerns. Although it protects all persons "in the power of' a belligerent state
(and its substantive requirements are much more specific than common Article 3), Protocol I does not prescribe an enforcement mechanism for this provision. That is, violations of Article 75, like those of
common Article 3, are not "grave breaches" of the Conventions, and it
82
is unclear whether they give rise to individual criminal liability.
Moreover, the legal status of Protocol I in many conflicts is itself somewhat ambiguous. The problem is that many states of geo-strategic significance have not ratified Protocol I including India, Iran, Iraq,

79 See, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
42-43 (2003).
80 Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law for the Twenty-First Century, in THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM

325, 328-30 (Michael N. Schmitt &

Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (noting the consensus view and evaluating the U.S. claim
to the contrary).
81

See, e.g.,

LINDSAY MOIR,

LAW

OF

INTERNATIONAL

ARMED

CONFLICT

155-60

(2002); Jinks, supra note 79, at 42-44.
82 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 41-42 (providing that "grave
breaches" regime of Protocol I does not include Article 75); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF

8 JUNE 1977

TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 992-93 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
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Israel, Pakistan, and the United States. 83 As a consequence, its legal
status for these states is unclear. Finally, the penal repression regime
of the Conventions protects all persons subject to prosecution for violations of the laws of war but these protections include only fair trial
rights-failing to establish any protection outside this context.
In short, although Geneva law accords unlawful combatants substantial protection, some gaps in the coverage of these protective
schemes persist. The current regime approximates, but falls short of,
protective parity. In Part III, I assess the propriety of this regime (and
its trajectory) through a sustained policy defense of protective parity.
III.

THE CASE FOR PROTECTIVE PARITY

The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims
that justify this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are
systematically overprotected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are systematically underprotected. I conclude that
the best regime would subject all captured combatants to a uniform
protective scheme. In this Part, I offer a conceptual and normative
defense of "protective parity"-suggesting that, under current law,
POWs are systematically overprotected and unlawful combatants are
systematically underprotected. In making the case for protective parity, I evaluate the strengths (and potential weaknesses) of this approach. I also analyze whether protective parity can be reconciled
with a strong commitment to the principle of distinction.
In Part III.A, I argue that the reasons for treating POWs fairly and
humanely are equally applicable to unlawful combatants. That is, the
policy claims favoring humane treatment are not tethered to the organizational characteristics that define POW status. In Part III.B, I argue
that the security based rationales for denying protections to unlawful
combatants are equally applicable to POWs. Once again, policy
claims are not linked to general organizational features of the fighting
force in question.
Finally, in Part III.C, I reject the claim that some treatment differential is appropriate to enforce the principle of distinction. Even if
"irregularization" undermines distinction, the question is how best to
encourage fighters to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that protective status categories are an inefficient way
to incentivize combatants because these categories necessarily trade
on collective considerations-such as the organizational characteristics of the fighting force. The rule of distinction would be better
83 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols, at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party-gc (last visited May 11, 2004).
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served, I submit, by an individualized "war crimes" approach that accords all fighters substantial humanitarian protection, and punishes
bad actors for failing to take adequate precautions under the
circumstances.
A.

Why Protect POWs?

As described in Part II, POWs enjoy substantial protection in Geneva law. Two kinds of claims justify this protection: humanitarian
and strategic. First, the core principles of humanitarian law provide
one important rationale. All captured fighters are "victims of war"
and, as human beings, are entitled to humane treatment.8 4 Geneva
law purports to protect only those combatants who have been rendered hors decombat-that is, combatants who, for whatever reason,
are no longer taking part in the hostilities. In other words, the "status" of captured fighters lies somewhere between "combatants" proper
and "noncombatants." They are detainees at the mercy of the detaining authority. In the absence of some compelling reason to deny protection, Geneva rules should accord humanitarian protection to such
persons.8 5 The point here is that this kind of rationale proves too
much-suggesting that all captured combatants should be accorded,
as a presumptive matter, humane treatment. The foundation of this
type of rationale is, in the end, the notion that certain entitlements
issue from the very "human-ness" of the individual. Clearly, this type
of claim does not track the definitional attributes of POW status-this
type of claim would justify treating unlawful combatants humanely as
well.
Second, there are compelling strategic reasons to treat the enemy
well. The general consensus is that observance of these rules is, in
most circumstances, in the interest of opposing forces. Indeed, there
is a substantial, interdisciplinary literature documenting the strategic
84 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) (outlining and offering an extended defense of this line of thought).
85 One such countervailing consideration is the structural claim that characterizes the traditionalist perspective. As discussed at length in the Introduction and Part
I, the idea here is that fair treatment might be offered as a carrot to induce fighters to
observe the law of war. In other words, the calibration of fair and humane treatment
serves a crucial structural function in humanitarian law. I evaluate this claim below.
Note for the moment, however, that this kind of point does not demonstrate that
unlawful combatants are not entitled to humane treatment. The logic of this claim
suggests only that the humanitarian ambitions of the law of war require the calibration of humane treatment accorded captured combatants.
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benefits of treating enemy POWs well. 86 Harsh treatment of the en-

emy deters surrender-encouraging enemy forces to fight to the
death. 8 7 Some evidence also suggests that poor treatment of the enemy undermines the morale of the capturing state's forces. 88 Other
studies suggest that humane treatment of the enemy improves the
ability of states to raise professional armies.8 9 And, so long as it is
consistent with the efficient pursuit of military objectives, humane
treatment minimizes various audience costs associated with waging
modern wars: it is easier to build and sustain support for the war effort
at home, and it is easier to build and sustain international operational
(warfighting) coalitions. 90 These claims, considered in isolation, are
unspectacular-indeed, the strategic benefits of treating POWs well
have long been understood. The important point for our purposes is
that these studies-whether they involve social psychological models
of soldiers, interview data from combatants, comparative surrender
and defection rates, or polling data-do not track the behavioral and
organizational prerequisites of POW status. That is, these studies
(and the claims that derive from them) document the importance of
treating members of the opposing armed forces well-without regard
to whether such persons satisfy the requirements for POW status. This
cluster of claims also proves too much-the reasons for treating POWs
well apply, in general, to unlawful combatants.
B.

Mhy Deny Unlawful Combatants (Certain)Protections?

Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to deny unlawful combatants some (or all) the protections accorded POWs. In Parts I and
II, I demonstrated (1) that Geneva law protects unlawful combatants-persons taking direct part in hostilities without satisfying the requirements for POW status, and (2) that these protections
approximate those accorded POWs. This section in essence assesses
86 See, e.g., DAN REITER & ALLAN C. STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR 65-69 (2002);
James D. Morrow, The InstitutionalFeaturesof Prisonerof War Treaties, 55 INT'L ORG. 971,
973-84 (2001) (summarizing this research).
87 See, e.g., REITER & STAM, supra note 86, at 67 (noting that "it is in the interest of
all states to treat POWs well in order to seduce the enemy to surrender"); Morrow,
supra note 86, at 976 ("Rumors about how POWs are treated spread rapidly within
armies and affect soldiers' willingness to surrender. When POWs are reportedly
treated poorly by a state, the opposing side's soldiers are less likely to surrender, preferring to fight on even in unfavorable situations.").
88 See, e.g., REITER & STAM, supra note 86, at 68-69.
89 See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 86, at 980-81.
90 See, e.g., RICH-ARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 35-36, 115-19 (2003); Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1509-27 (2003).
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the following hypothesis: the current regime-substantial protection
with some important differentials-strikes the proper balance between humanitarianism and military necessity.
Consider again the case of the detainees in Cuba. Recall that the
official U.S. government position is that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda
fighters qualify as POWs because they failed to satisfy international
standards defining lawful combatants. 9 1 In short, the United States
maintains that assignment of POW status in this case would be incorrect as a matter of law and imprudent as a matter of policy. A brief
summary of the policy arguments is useful for present purposes. Specifically, the United States argues that neither group of captured fighters satisfies the express requirements of the GPW, and that POW
protections would impede the investigation and prosecution of suspected terrorists. 9 2 Of particular concern on the policy front are (1)
restrictions on the interrogation of POWs; 93 (2) the criminal proce-

dure rights of POWs (which might preclude trial by special "military
commission") ;94 (3) the right of POWs to release and repatriation fol91 See U.S. Dept. of Defense, News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02082002
_t02O8sd.html; White House Press Office, Fact Sheet: "Status of Detainees on Guantanamo," (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
02/20020207-13.html [hereinafter U.S. Policy on Guantanamo Detainees]. For a
summary of the government's position, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 476-80 (2002)
(discussing the United States' decision not to regard persons detained in Afganistan
as POWs);John Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush Shifts Position on Detainees,WASH. POST, Feb.
8, 2002, at Al.
92 For a summary of the government's position, see Murphy, supra note 91 passim; Mintz & Allen, supra note 91; see alsoJoyce Howard Price, Detainees Not POWs
Insists White House, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at Al (discussing interrogation rationale); Rowan Scarborough, Geneva Rulesfor Taliban, not al Qaeda, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2002, at Al (discussing repatriation and military tribunals rationales); Rowan Scarborough, Powell Wants Detainees to be Declared POWs; Memo Shows Differences with White
House, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al (discussing a leaked memo from White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez in which he states that the war against terrorism
"renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners").
93 Under the GPW, the detaining authority may not subject POWs to coercive
questioning, and POWs are required only to provide name, rank, and serial number
to interrogators. See GPW, supra note 1, arts. 17-18, 6 U.S.T. at 3330-34, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 148-52; Jeremy Rabkin, After Guantanamo: The War Over the Geneva Conventions,
NAT'L INT., Summer 2002, at 15 (defending denial of POW status to Taliban and al
Qaeda detainees, in part, on this ground); Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War Can't
Protect Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at All (same).
94 See Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, §1 (f), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order]. It is a fair reading of the GPW that POWs facing criminal
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lowing the cessation of hostilities; 9 5 and (4) possible claims of "combatant immunity" that might shield individuals from prosecution for
acts of terrorism. The U.S. position is that these rights are inconsistent with various security imperatives. On the strength of these claims
(and the merits of its classification determination), the United States
concluded that the detainees are "unlawful combatants" (or "un96
privileged belligerents") not protected by the Geneva Conventions.
I want to make two general points; then say a bit more about a
couple of these issues. First, some of these rights are not unique to
POW status. For example, the GC recognizes interrogation rights,
and the right to release and repatriation are accorded several categories of detainees-indeed, the language of the two treaties is identical.
Second, these security based claims, if correct, prove too much. These
security based claims would apply irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. That is, if these protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests, then POWs are
systematically overprotected.
To analyze whether the prevailing scheme overprotects unlawful
combatants, it is important to examine more closely the unique protective consequences of POW status. Two potentially important protections highlighted by the U.S. position merit more extended
charges are entitled to trial by court-martial or regular civil court. See GPW, supra
note 1, arts. 99, 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3392-94, 75 U.N.T.S. at 210-12; Laura A. Dickinson,
UsingLegal Process to Fight Terrorism:Detentions, Military Commissions, InternationalTribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407, 1423-24 (2002); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
LJ. 1259, 1263-66 (2002) (concluding, in view of rights recognized in the GPW, that
the Military Order must cover only unlawful belligerents); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of
Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. INT'L L.
320, 324-26 (2002); Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes
to War: ProsecutingTerroristsBefore Military Commissions, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653,
659-63 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001). Under this view, denying POW status would appear to
leave open the possibility of trying detainees before military commissions for violations of the law of war.
95 See GPW, supra note 1, arts. 117-18, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224 (recognizing the right to repatriation); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdictionof Military Commissions
and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 Am.J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (2002) (suggesting that
this right is one procedural consequence of denying POW status); Rabkin, supra note
93, at 19-20 (defending denial of POW status to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, in
part, on this ground); Wedgwood, supra note 93 (same).
96 In addition, the U.S. government asserts that the Geneva Conventions do not,
in any case, apply to al Qaeda fighters-because that group is a nongovernmental,
criminal organization not party to the treaties. See U.S. Policy on Guantanamo Detainees, supra note 91 ("Al-Qaida is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a
foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to POW status.").

1518

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

consideration. First, the GPW prohibits trial of POWs by special military courts (such as military commissions).9 7 The Convention provides that POWs "can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has
been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power."9 8 There is no analogue in the GC. Second, POWs enjoy a
broad "combatant immunity" that precludes punishing them for their
very participation in the hostilities.9 9 Civilians enjoy no such immunity. Although these claims also prove too much (in that the logic
that undergirds them would also apply to POWs), I have a bit more to
say about each.
1. Assimilation Rights and Ad Hoc "Military Commissions"
One potentially important consequence of POW status is that it
precludes the use of specialized, ad hoc criminal proceedings (such as
the contemplated military commissions). This point enjoys a surface
plausibility in that the GPW requires that POWs be tried by the same
courts in which the armed forces of the detaining power would be
tried.1 00 POWs held by the United States, for example, must be tried
in U.S. courts-martial. This rule, for which there is no direct analogue
in the GC, seemingly suggests that military commissions are a viable
prosecutorial option only if the detainees are not POWs.
This claim, however, requires some qualification. As described in
detail in Part II, unlawful combatants enjoy general criminal procedure rights that mirror the protections accorded POWs. If the policy
value of military commissions derives from their summary procedures,
then the protections afforded unlawful combatants would deprive the
commissions of their value in any case. That is, the rights of unlawful
combatants would require procedural guarantees that closely approximate those of courts-martial.
The military commission procedures arguably fail to satisfy in several respects the minimum requirements of Geneva law. For example,
the commissions themselves arguably do not constitute impartial, independent tribunals. 10 1 The commissions arguably do not qualify as
97 See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban
Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the InternationalLegal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2002); Katyal
& Tribe, supra note 94 passim; Paust, supra note 94 passim.
98 GPW, supra note 1, art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75 U.N.T.S. at 212.
99 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
100 See GPW, supra note 1, art. 82, 6 U.S.T. at 3382, 75 U.N.T.S. at 200.
101 See, e.g., LAWYER'S COMM. FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER:
A GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONs 5 (2003) [hereinafter
TRIALs UNDER MILITARY ORDER] (arguing that the military commission scheme is "par-
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"tribunals established by law," and they clearly are not "regularly constituted courts."'10 2 In addition, the Department of Defense procedures arguably deprive defendants of any meaningful right to
counsel. 0 3 They also limit the defendant's ability to mount an effective defense by sharply qualifying the right to confront witnesses and
compel process. 10 4 Finally, the procedures do not recognize a right to
appeal to a higher tribunal. 0 5 In addition, the Geneva Conventions
arguably prohibit irregular "military commissions" irrespective of the
procedural rights guaranteed in such proceedings. Recall that all persons facing criminal punishment are entitled to trial by "regularly constituted court[s].' 1 0

6

Moreover, it is important to point out that this

POW "right" to trial by regular military court is, in many instances, a
disability. That is, trial procedures utilized by military courts often fall
10 7
short of international due process standards.
ticularly susceptible to abuse because the entire process is limited to one branch of
government (the executive) with no meaningful independent oversight or review by
either the judiciary or the legislature, and none of the participants has both standing
and an interest to challenge possible abuses.").
102 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Militay Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD
Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH.

J.

INT'L

L. 677, 687-90 (2002).

103 One problematic aspect of the rules is that civilian counsel (the counsel chosen by the accused) can be excluded from "closed Commission proceedings" and
denied "access to any information protected under [the procedure's security exclusion]." U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, §§ 4(C)(3),
6(B) (3), 6(D) (5) (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD Order], available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf; see also Paust, supra note 102, at
690.
104 The procedures drastically curtail the right of confrontation. Cross-examination of witnesses against the accused is authorized only with respect to witnesses "who
appear before the Commission." DOD Order, supra note 103, § 5(I). Witnesses can
also provide testimony "by telephone, audiovisual means, or other means," by "introduction of prepared declassified summaries of evidence," "testimony from prior trials
and proceedings," "sworn [and even] unsworn written statements," and "reports." Id.
§ 6(D). See also Paust, supra note 102, at 685-87.
105 Verdicts issued by the military commissions may be appealed to specially established "Review Panels." See DOD Order, supra note 103, § 6(H)(4); see also TRIALS
UNDER MILITARY ORDER, supra note 101, at 5-6 (criticizing the absence of a right to
appeal guilty verdicts to a civilian court).
106 See GWS, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; GWS
Sea, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra note 1,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90; Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37.
107 See, e.g., U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protectionof Human Rights: Issue of
the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4 (2002) (summarizing the poor human rights record of
military courts).

1520

2.

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

Combatant Immunity

Another potentially significant protective consequence of POW
status is combatant immunity. Indeed, comparison of the schemes analyzed in Parts I and II makes clear that the real purchase of POW
status is combatant immunity and not the procedural rights protections attaching to the designation. That is, the most significant consequence of POW status is that lawful combatants cannot be punished
for their otherwise lawful participation in the hostilities. This point of
law, although firmly established, requires some qualification.
First, although POWs are entitled to engage in combat, they must
comply with the laws of war.10 8 Accordingly, a POW may be prosecuted for pre-capture offenses only if his actions (1) rise to the level of
a "war crime"'1 9 or "crimes against humanity;" 11 0 or (2) are unrelated
to the state of hostilities (i.e., are common crimes).1 1 ' Properly understood, the scope of combatant immunity therefore underscores its
relative insignificance on the policy front. Consider that acts of ter108

See, e.g., MYREs S. McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P.

FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 712 (1961):

[A]cts committed in war by enemy civilians and members of armed forces
may be punished as crimes under a belligerent's municipal law only to the
extent that such acts are violative of the international law on the conduct of
hostilities. Clearly the rules of warfare would be pointless ... if every single
act of war may by unilateral municipal fiat be made a common crime and
every prisoner of war executed as a murderer. International law delineates
the outer limits of the liability of supposed war criminals; and conformity
with that law affords a complete defense for the violent acts charged.
Id.; see also, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, at 11.7.1 (1997) ("Prisoners of war may not be
punished for hostile acts directed against opposing forces prior to capture, unless
those acts constituted violations of the law of armed conflict.").
109 Even if convicted for pre-capture offenses, enemy combatants retain the benefits of the POW regime of GPW according to Article 85 of that treaty: "Prisoners of
war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention." GPW,
supra note 1, art. 85, 6 U.S.T. at 3384, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202.
110 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY- III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 422 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GPW COMMENTARY] (identifying "crimes against humanity" as a crime that
pierces combatant immunity).
111 See id. at 413-23 (setting forth rule); see also United States v. Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. 1506, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd, 117 F.3d 1206 (l1th Cir. 1997) (prosecuting
prisoner of war for drug trafficking). Therefore, the immunity does not shield from
prosecution enemy combatants charged with pre-capture terrorist offenses not related to the conflict.
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rorism in the context of an armed conflict are always war crimes 1 12as are all attacks directed against the civilian population as such.11 3 In
14
addition, violations of the rule of distinction are also war crimes' as are acts of perfidy.1 15 The upshot is that there are no protective
consequences associated with POW status for persons who have engaged in terrorism, attacked civilians, or committed warlike acts without adequately distinguishing themselves from civilians.
Second, POWs, even if immune from criminal prosecution, may
be deprived of their liberty because of their participation in the hostilities1 16 That is, allenemy combatants, even if POWs, may be detained
without criminal charge for the duration of the hostilities.
In short, the policy and protective consequences of combatant
immunity are minimal. Combatant immunity, properly defined, confers protection on one important category of fighters: unlawful combatants who have otherwise complied with the law of war. These
fighters-if denied POW status and therefore denied combatant immunity-may be prosecuted upon capture for their very participation
in the hostilities. A compete defense of protective parity must demonstrate that all combatants should enjoy this immunity. In the balance
of this subsection, I take up this task.
112

See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, "Terrorism," and InternationalHumani-

tarianLaw, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 547 (2002) (cataloguing various war crimes provisions implicated by acts of terrorism). Consider that such acts typically violate several
provisions of Geneva law including: (1) the prohibition on attacks of civilians and
civilian objects, Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 51-52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27; (2) the
prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, id. art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26; (3) the murder
of persons no longer taking active part in hostilities, GWS, supra note 1, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34; GWS Sea, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at
3220-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86-88; GPW, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136-38; GC, supra note 1, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at
288-90; Protocol I, supranote 1, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 386; and (4) the murder of
persons "protected" by the Conventions. See, e.g., GC, supra note 1, art. 146, 6 U.S.T.
at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386 (establishing the "grave breach" provision of the GC).
Moreover, acts of terrorism are now expressly identified as "war crimes" in Protocol I
and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See Protocol I,
supra note 1, art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 ("Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.");
Statute of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex art. 4(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (criminalizing "acts
of terrorism").
113 See Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 51(2), 52(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27.
114 See, e.g., id. art. 44(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 (requiring combatants to distinguish
themselves from civilian population).
115 See, e.g., id. arts. 37-39, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21-22 (prohibiting acts of perfidy).
116 GPW, supra note 1, art. 21-22, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-36, 75 U.N.T.S. at 152-54.
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There are sound policy reasons to accord all captured combatants immunity for their otherwise lawful warlike acts. Combatant immunity-given its contours as just described-could and should be
used as a tool to promote compliance with the rules of war. If all
captured combatants failing to satisfy the requirements for POW status are subject to prosecution for any warlike acts, then these fighters
have no incentive to comply with the law of war in the conduct of
hostilities. Although their very failure to satisfy POW status requirements suggests some conduct contrary to the laws of war, this conduct,
in many instances, may not reflect any individual culpability. Recall
that POW status turns on collective considerations.1 17 In this sense,
the rules are directed primarily to the high command and other
policymakers. For example, it is inapposite to characterize as "criminal" (as a formal or sociological matter) the otherwise lawful warlike
acts of: (1) civilians who take up arms to defend their country against
an enemy to whom they owe no allegiance;" 8 (2) soldiers fighting for
a state that, as a matter of policy, does not issue uniforms satisfying the
POW rules; or (3) soldiers fighting for a state that, as a general matter,
has not complied with the rules of war. In addition, "unlawful" belligerency, fighting without satisfying the requirements for POW status,
does not in all circumstances threaten the civilian population-that is,
not all acts of "unlawful" belligerency undermine the principle of distinction. This is obviously true in some circumstances-think of an
irregular fighter (who is out of uniform perhaps) manning a tank,
armored vehicle, or fighter aircraft. In such circumstances, the
fighter's status as a combatant is clear to the attacking forces of the
enemy; and, as a consequence, the structural capacity of these attacking forces to distinguish between civilians and combatants is not compromised. Consider two more nuanced examples: (1) irregular
117 See id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
118 In some circumstances, such civilians are indeed entitled to POW status-irrespective of whether they are "regularized." See id. art. 4(A) (6), 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75
U.N.T.S. at 140 (according POW status to all "[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units,
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war."). The
scope of this provision, however, is unclear because the spontaneity and "insufficient
time to organize" elements are ambiguous. See GPW COMMENTARY, supranote 110, at
67-68. The more broadly the provision is read, the more closely Geneva law approximates protective parity. The important point is that these requirements only loosely
track individual culpability. In addition, the very fact that these so-called levees en
masse are accorded POW status suggests that, as a structural matter, Geneva law seeks
to protect combatants who fight in a way that exhibits no culpability-even if this
protection may compromise the principle of distinction.
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fighters positioned on the battlefield so as to make clear to the enemy
their belligerent status; and (2) irregular fighters embedded in regular armed forces clearly deployed in an aggressive posture. These examples suggest that the criminal character of belligerent acts will
depend on the circumstances surrounding the commission of any
such acts. In other words, some conduct that results in the denial of
POW status suggests culpability; some does not.
Protective parity provides the best approach to the problem.
Captured combatants (irrespective of their status) should be subject
to criminal prosecution only if they have committed acts that constitute war crimes. Conversely, if combatants do not engage in such acts,
they should not be punished for their very participation in the conduct of war. As I develop more fully below, this rule poses no grave
danger to the principle of distinction if we define as war crimes all acts
of irregularization that, given the circumstances, threaten innocent
civilians. 119
Critics of the view advanced here might defend the criminalization of unlawful belligerency on the grounds that (1) the irregularization of warfare resulting from such acts (irrespective of whether they
exhibit a culpable mental state) poses a grave and generalized threat
to civilians; and (2) the criminal sanction is necessary to deter such
persons from taking up arms. 120 Although plausible, this line of reasoning suffers from two structural defects. First, criminalization of
belligerency creates perverse incentives for the unlawful combatantsbecause their very participation in the hostilities subjects them to
criminal prosecution upon capture, they have no incentive to comply
with the law of war. Protecting the victims of warfare, including civilians, might best be achieved by maximizing the incentives of combatants (those who are engaged in the fight) to comply with the law of
war. As discussed above, the criminalization of belligerency eschews
this type of incentive structure in favor of one that seeks to discourage
would-be fighters from taking up arms in the first place. Second,
119 This is, in general, the approach of Protocol I. See Protocol I, supra note 1, art.
44(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23 ("In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.").
120 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004). Here I analyze whether the provision of
combatant immunity to all fighters would subvert the "principle of distinction." In
the next section, I address the more general claim that the denial of humanitarian
protection to unlawful combatants incentivizes fighters to observe the "principle of
distinction." See infra Part III.C.
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criminalization of belligerency does not substantially alter the incentive structure of civilians contemplating participation in hostilities. All
would-be combatants have nontrivial reasons to refrain from any direct participation in the hostilities. Recall that "peaceful" civilians are
immune from lawful attack; all combatants, on the other hand, may
be made the object of attack. In addition, "peaceful" civilians may be
detained only in a narrow range of circumstances, whereas all combatants, upon capture, may be detained for the duration of the hostilities.
In short, the structure of Geneva law discourages civilian participation
in armed conflict. This is not to say that civilians participate in hostilities at a low rate. The point is that would-be fighters take up arms
only if they are willing to assume substantial risk to life and liberty.
The pool of civilians otherwise willing to fight includes only those who
value highly the benefits they expect to issue from participation in the
fight. For these individuals, the criminalization of belligerency adds
only a modest disincentive (if any) to join the fight.
C. Protective Parity and the Principleof Distinction
The Geneva Conventions protect unlawful combatants, and this
protection very closely approximates that accorded POWs. At first
blush, this outcome might seem normatively unattractive. After all, if
POW status is irrelevant, then combatants (and states) arguably have
no incentive to comply with the organizational requirements of the
GPW. And, of course, such an incentive structure would risk unraveling the fabric of international humanitarian law by eroding the "rule
of distinction." In short, overprotection of unlawful combatants risks
systematic underprotection of "innocent" civilians as a whole.
Although there is much to recommend this line of argument, it is
in the end predicated on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between protective status and conduct. That is, the humanitarian
critique of protective parity assumes that protection is a carrot (and
denial of protection, a stick) to induce law-abiding conduct in time of
war. One could, perhaps, design a rational humanitarian regime
around the principle that its protections should cover only those who
comply with its substantive commands. That, however, is not an organizing principle of Geneva law. To the contrary, the scope, content,
and trajectory of Geneva law clearly demonstrate that humanitarian
protection is not used as an incentive to comply with the laws of war.
Indeed, the protective regimes of Geneva law expressly condition the
authority of states to enforce its substantive rules. Consider that the
penal repression regime of the 1949 Conventions and Article 75 of
Protocol I require states to accord all persons accused of violating the
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Conventions certain due process rights.1 2 1 In addition, the GPW
makes clear that POWs do not lose their protective status even if convicted of the most serious war crimes. 12 2 Nevertheless, this may only
prove that Geneva law is incoherent and normatively suspect. In
other words, these points do not address the deeper issue of whether
"protective parity" is consistent with the principle of distinction.
Assume that the organizational and behavioral prerequisites for
POW status would, if observed, promote the rule of distinction-a
questionable but useful assumption. The only question then is how
best to encourage fighters to comply with these standards. An important point here is that, although Geneva law provides substantial protection to unlawful combatants, it nevertheless provides incentives for
individuals to comply with its rules. As discussed more fully in Parts I
and II, persons violating the laws of war face the prospect of criminal
prosecution. Geneva law, in this sense, might be understood as exhibiting a two-pronged strategy: (1) it protects all persons subject to the
authority of a belligerent state (or armed opposition group) irrespective of their "status" (what I have called "protective parity"); and (2) it
subjects all persons violating its substantive rules to criminal prosecution irrespective of their "status" (what I will call the "war crimes" approach to enforcement).
Of course, critics of protective parity might suggest that these two
commitments are not so easily separated. These critics might point
out that some rules defining status categories (such as the definition
of POWs) are themselves also primary rules of conduct. After all,
121 Compare these robust procedural rights with the minimal procedural protections accorded in status determination proceedings. See, e.g., GPW, supra note 1, art.
5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42 (requiring only that "should any doubt
arise," status is determined by a "competent tribunal"). For a detailed analysis of Article 5, see Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-WarStatus, 84 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 571
(2002).
122 GPW, supra note 1, art. 85, 6 U.S.T. at 3384, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202 ("Prisoners of
war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."). Although the provision references "the laws of the Detaining Power"-which might be
understood as distinct from the "laws of war," the drafting history, ICRC Commentary,
and interpretation of leading military manuals make clear that it encompasses prosecution for "international" crimes. It is also important to note that the GC does not
have a direct analogue to Article 85. However, this provision was considered necessary in the GPW because of the conduct elements embedded in the definition of
POWs. See id. art. 4(A)(4), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138. No such provision is
required in the GC because (1) its definition of "protected persons" does not include
any conduct elements, and (2) the Article 5 derogation regime provides an exhaustive
catalogue of protective consequences issuing from conduct. See GC, supra note 1,
arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-92.
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when an enemy combatant removes his uniform (donning only civilian clothing) and conceals his weapons, he has committed conduct
that arguably both (1) deprives him upon capture of POW status, and
(2) transgresses the rule of distinction (and perhaps the prohibition
on perfidy)-hence, endangering innocent civilians. That is, the
same conduct determines whether the combatant is a POW and
whether he has committed a war crime. This contention, so framed, is
both accurate and important-though not for the reason our critics
might suppose. It is correct to say that the same conduct might have
both status consequences and criminal consequences, but this only
underscores the conceptual integrity of protective parity. Consider
again the case of the hypothetical combatant fighting in civilian
clothes with arms concealed. There are, as just described, two consequences: denial of POW status and prosecution for war crimes. Under
the principle of protective parity, the first consequence has no protective implications. The second consequence, as a formal matter, also
has no protective implications. Throughout his confinement and any
criminal proceedings (irrespective of the outcome), the fighter will
enjoy the full protections of the Geneva law. On the other hand, our
hypothetical fighter will face negative consequences-criminal punishment for his acts. Negative consequences issue from the fighter's
failure to comply with the laws of war, but the imposition of these
negative consequences is itself governed by the protective schemes of
Geneva law. The important point is that the scope and content of
protective schemes are conceptually distinct from the scope and content of enforcement schemes. The former need not be inextricably
connected to the latter. The upshot is that protective parity need not
erode the rule of distinction-protection can coincide with the energetic suppression of war crimes.
Moreover, there are good reasons to prefer from a deterrence
perspective the prevailing approach in Geneva law. Recall that there
are at least two ways to build into humanitarian regimes structural incentives to comply: (1) denial of humanitarian protection to bad actors (coupled perhaps with criminal prosecutions); or (2) criminal
prosecution of bad actors (all of whom nevertheless enjoy humanitarian protection). Geneva law-preferring war crimes prosecutions
over denial of humanitarian protection-is narrowly tailored to punish only bad actors. That is, the "war crimes" approach targets persons
who, with a culpable mental state, have committed acts causing or risking grave consequences for protected persons. The "denial of protective status" approach, on the other hand, punishes an unacceptably
broad range of conduct including all acts which would have the effect
of depriving captured persons of protective status.
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The "war crimes" approach is preferable because it emphasizes
culpability. Not all conduct depriving persons of POW status may be
classified as war crimes (and the inverse is obviously false-not all conduct constituting a war crime would deprive a combatant of POW status). Indeed, the overlap encompasses only conduct that threatens
the humanitarian values of Geneva law. Two examples illustrate the
point. First consider that several categories of persons accompanying
the armed forces-including civilian members of military aircraft
crews, war correspondents, and supply contractors-are entitled to
POW status provided they have express authorization to do so and
carry an identification card documenting this authorization. 123 Any
such persons captured in battle without proper identification or without express authorization may well be denied POW status-although
this conduct arguably would not rise to the level of a war crime. In
addition, individual members of a fighting force that systematically violates the laws of war may well be denied POW status-even if the
individual fighter has not committed and is not complicit in any violations himself. 1 24 Loss of status, in short, cannot be equated with culpability. These examples demonstrate that the "war crimes" approach
is a more exacting tool-directing punitive action toward culpable
persons.
The "war crimes" approach also corrects some perverse incentives
created by the "denial of protection" approach. Note first that the
example of the law-abiding fighter in the law-disregarding fighting
force (described in the previous paragraph) illustrates this point.
Under the "war crimes" approach, the fighter has some incentive to
obey the laws of war, whereas the "denial of protection" approach assures that he will suffer punitive measures at the hands of the enemy
irrespective of his personal conduct. Moreover, the "denial of protection" approach might lengthen and intensify conflicts by providing a
disincentive to surrender. As discussed above, military planners and
soldiers have long understood that poor treatment of captured enemy
fighters often backfires because it encourages the enemy to "fight to
the death.

' 125

The important point here is that the same logic applies

to the conduct of all combatants-whether they satisfy the requirements of POW status or not.

123 See GPW, supra note 1, art. 4(A) (4), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
124 See id. art. 4(A) (2) (d), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
125 See, e.g., OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 36; see also supra notes
86-90 and accompanying text (outlining research demonstrating the strategic benefits of such treatment).
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CONCLUSION

Humanitarian protection in time of war should not vary by detainee status category. Through an analysis of the legal situation of
unlawful combatants, I illustrate that (1) protective schemes are converging; and (2) although the protective significance of POW status is
declining, there are some persistent gaps in coverage. Building on
this descriptive base, I provide a comprehensive normative defense of
protective parity. The unique protective significance of POW status
suggests that POWs are systematically, though only modestly, overprotected and unlawful combatants are systematically underprotected. If
protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests, POWs
are systematically overprotected. That is, these security based claims,
if valid, would apply irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. If humane treatment of the enemy
increases battlefield effectiveness (because poor treatment discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop morale, and decreases political support for the war effort), then unlawful combatants
are systematically underprotected. I also argue that protective parity is
consistent with the principle of distinction. Even if "irregularization"
undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain
that protective status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize
individual combatants because these categories necessarily trade on
collective considerations-such as the organizational characteristics of
the fighting force. The rule of distinction would be better served by
an individualized "war crimes" approach that accorded all fighters
substantial humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic requirements of due process) individual bad actors.

